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Learning and communication play important roles in coordinating activities.  Game
theory and experiments have made a significant contribution to our understanding and
appreciation for the issues surrounding learning and communication in coordination.
However, the results of past experimental studies provide conflicting results about the
performance of learning models. Moreover, the interaction between learning and
communication has not been systematically investigated. Our long run objective is to
overcome the conflicting results and to provide a better understanding of the interaction.
To this end, we econometrically investigate a sender-receiver game environment where
communication is necessary for coordination and learning is essential for
communication. (JEL C72, C91, C92)1
LEARNING AND COMMUNICATION
IN SENDER-RECEIVER GAMES: AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION
1. INTRODUCTION
Learning plays an important role in coordinating activities be it a market or an
organization.  Communication goes hand in hand with learning when addressing problems
of coordination.  Game theory has made a significant contribution to our understanding
and appreciation for the issues surrounding learning and communication in coordinating
activities, e.g., Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1992).  Experiments have picked up this
theme with an extensive and growing literature that investigates learning in strategic
settings.  However, as detailed in the related literature section of our paper, the results of
these studies provide conflicting results about the performance of the chosen learning
models. Moreover, the interaction between learning and communication has not been
systematically investigated. Our long-run objective is to overcome the previous conflicting
experimental results on learning and to investigate the interaction of learning and
communication in coordinating activities. We chose our sender-receiver environment
because communication is necessary for coordination and learning is essential for
communication when messages are a priori meaningless.
We address these two problems by focusing on data from sender-receiver games in
which documented learning takes place (Andreas  Blume, Douglas V.  DeJong, Yong-2
Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle, 1998).  Sender-receiver games play a prominent role
in theory and applied work in accounting, economics, finance and political science. 
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Communication is essential in this game because it is the only way to link the receiver’s
action to the private information of the sender. The players are members of a population
of players, senders and receivers. The population environment mitigates repeated game
effects and, therefore, is particularly suitable for evaluating myopic learning rules. The
players learn only about actions, not strategies of other players, either privately or at the
population level; this separates this paper from bulk of the empirical work on learning in
strategic form games. When population information is available, it is only about sender
play. In this environment, learning is essential for players to coordinate because messages
are costless and a priori meaningless.
We compare two learning rules, the stimulus-response (SR) model of Alvin Roth and
Ido Irev (1995) and a simple belief-based learning (BBL) model in the spirit of fictitious
play (Julia Robinson, 1951) or one of its stochastic variants (Drew Fudenberg and David
M. Kreps, 1993).  SR learning can be and has been applied in a wide variety of settings. It
requires only minimal cognitive abilities on the part of players. This feature of the model is
appealing for those who want to show that high-rationality predictions can be derived
from a low-rationality model. A closely related feature is that SR learning requires only
minimal information. All that players need to know are the payoffs from their own past
actions; they need not know that they are playing a game, they need not know their
opponents’ payoff or their past play. These two characteristics make the SR model a
natural benchmark for our investigation.3
  On the other hand, it seems quite likely that individuals would try to exercise more
cognitive ability and hence try to use other available information.  In BBL models, players
use more information than their own historical payoffs. This information may include their
own opponents’ play, the play of all possible opponents and the play of all players. Models
of this kind embody a higher level of rationality; e.g. fictitious play can be interpreted as
optimizing behavior given beliefs that are derived from Bayesian updating.
Our sender-receiver game environment is challenging for the learning models because
in formulating the SR model for this extensive form setting we have to decide whether the
players are updating actions or strategies. We choose actions on the grounds that this is
cognitively simpler than strategies. For BBL it is challenging because senders do not have
direct information on receiver behavior at the population level. For all treatments, we ask
whether the SR model or the BBL model better describes learning. The initial step in our
analysis was to fit the SR and BBL models to the data produced by the various treatments.
The most striking fact of our analysis is that for common interest games both models fit
the data reasonably well as measured by McFadden’s  (1974) psuedo-R
2.
We let the BBL model take a form that is analogous to the SR model. In both
cases choice probabilities depend on unobserved propensities. The models differ in how
the propensities are updated. In the SR model the propensity for taking an action is solely
dependent on a player’s own past payoffs from that action, whereas in the BBL model the
propensity depends on the expected payoff. Our focus attention for both the SR and BBL
model is the data generated by senders. We chose senders because they have the same
number of strategies in all the games considered. This makes the econometric analysis and
the comparisons much more transparent.4
Our empirical findings for sender data can be summarized as follows. In the setting of
common interest games when information on history is available, both the SR and BBL
models tend to fit the data reasonably well as measured by the coefficient of
determination. In the absence of history information, however, SR fits the data
substantially better than BBL. We find this reassuring since it is compatible with the view
that players use history information in forming their expectations, provided it is available.
For divergent interest games, the results are sensitive to the equilibrium selected. Both SR
and BBL fit the data reasonably well in the case of separating  equilibria, but neither
performs well for pooling equilibria. The fit of BBL in the case of pooling equilibria is
especially poor.
The SR and BBL models are non-nested in the sense that the SR model is not a special
case of the BBL model and vice versa. Nevertheless, the two models can be artificially
nested with the consequence that they can be compared using standard testing procedures.
This fact has been exploited by Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho (1999), who recognized
that SR and BBL models are nested in a general class of models which use propensities to
determine choice probabilities. In the context of artificial nesting, the results clearly show
that the problem of distinguishing between SR and BBL models is particularly acute in the
case of common interest games with history. On the other hand, the test results accept SR
and reject BBL in the games with no history and in all but one of the divergent interest
games. The results from artificial nesting are consistent with the story suggested by the
coefficient of determination.
A point often overlooked in empirical work is that information about learning can only
come from observations where learning occurs.  Once behavior has converged,5
observations have no further information about learning.  Including such observations will
make the SR and BBL models appear to fit better, while at the same time reducing the
contrast between the models, making it difficult to distinguish the models empirically.  We
call this effect convergence bias.  A preliminary examination suggested that our non-
nested results were affected to some degree by convergence bias.  Accordingly, we
eliminated observations where it appeared that learning has ceased and reanalyzed the
remaining data.  The results of this reexamination were not markedly different from our
original finding.  In general, however, the convergence effect can strongly influence the
test results based on artificial nesting because this kind of nesting tends to induce
collinearity between the explanatory variables.
As has been noted, the results clearly show that the problem of distinguishing between
SR and BBL models is particularly acute in the case of common interest games with
history. The last section of the paper outlines an agenda for how we can learn more about
learning and communication through experiments.
2. GAMES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our data are generated from repeated play of sender-receiver games among randomly
matched players. Players are drawn from two populations, senders and receivers, and
rematched after each round of play.  The games played in each period are between an
informed sender and an uninformed receiver.  The sender is privately informed about his
type, q1 or q2, and types are equally likely.  The sender sends a message, * or #, to the
receiver, who responds with an action, a1, a2 or a3.  Payoffs depend on the sender's private6
information, his type, and the receiver's action, and not on the sender’s message. The
payoffs used in the different treatments are given in Table 1 below, with the first entry in
each cell denoting the sender’s payoff and the second entry the receiver’s payoff. For
example, in Game 2, if the sender's type is q1 and the receiver takes action a2, the payoffs
to the sender and receiver are 700,700, respectively.
A strategy for the sender maps types into messages; for the receiver, a strategy maps
messages to actions.  A strategy pair is a Nash equilibrium if the strategies are mutual best
replies.  The equilibrium is called separating if each sender type is identified through his
message.  In a pooling equilibrium, the equilibrium action does not depend on the sender's
type; such an equilibrium exists for all sender-receiver games. In Game 2, an example of a
separating equilibrium is one where the sender sends * if he is q1 and # otherwise and the
receiver takes action a2 after message * and a1 otherwise.  An example of a pooling
equilibrium is one in which the sender, regardless of type, sends * and the receiver always
takes action a3.
A replication of a game is played with a cohort of twelve players, six senders and six
receivers. Players are randomly designated as either a sender or receiver at the start of the
replication and keep their designation throughout.  In each period of a game, senders and
receivers are paired using a random matching procedure.  Sender types are independently
and identically drawn in each period for each sender.
In each period, players then play a two-stage game.  Prior to the first stage, senders
are informed about their respective types.  In the first stage, senders send a message to the
receiver they are paired with.  In the second stage, receivers take an action after receiving7
a message from the sender they are paired with.  Each sender and receiver pair then learns
the sender type, message sent, action taken and payoff received
To ensure that messages have no a priori meaning, each player is endowed with his
own representation of the message space, i.e. both the form that messages take and the
order in which they are represented on the screen is individualized.  The message space M
= {*, # } is observed by all players and for each player either appears in the order #,* or *,
#.  Unique to each player, these messages are then mapped into an underlying,
unobservable message space, M = {A,B}.  The mappings are designed such that they
destroy all conceivable focal points that players might use for a priori coordination, Blume
et al. (1998).  The representation and ordering are stable over the replication.  Thus, the
experimental design focuses on the cohort's ability to develop a language as a function of
the game being played and the population history provided.
Note that in this setting we learn the players’ action choices, not their strategies. Also,
the players themselves receive information about actions, not strategies. They do not
observe which message (action) would have been sent (taken) by a sender (receiver) had
the sender's type (message received) been different. This is important for how we
formulate our learning rules; e.g. the hypothetical updating (see Camerer and Ho (1997))
of unused actions that occurs in BBL does not and cannot rely on knowing opponents’
strategies but instead uses information about the population distribution of play.
We consider five experimental treatments, each with three replications. Each
replication is divided into two sessions, Session I, which is common to all treatments and
Session II, which varies across treatments. We concentrate on Session II data. The
treatments examined here differ in terms of the players’ incentives and the information that8
is available after each period of play. For one treatment, the only information available to a
player is the history of play in her own past matches.  Two questions are examined for
these cases. The first is whether learning takes place.  If learning does take place, the
second question is whether  learning is captured by the SR model. In all the other
treatments, there is information available to the players in addition to the history of play in
their own past matches. For both senders and receivers, this information is the history of
play of the population of senders. Three questions are examined for these treatments. The
first again is whether learning takes place. If learning does take place, the second question
is whether learning is different from that in the previous treatment, and the third is whether
the BBL model better describes learning than the SR model.
 The data from the experiments in Blume et al. (1998) consists of three replications for
each game. Replications for Game 1 and 2 were played for 20 periods and Game 3 and 4
for 40 periods. There were two different treatments conducted with Game 1, one with and
one without population history.  The treatments are summarized in Table 2.
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 In this paper we focus on the analysis of sender behavior. The attraction of
concentrating on sender behavior is that senders have the same number of strategies in all
of our treatments. A potential drawback of this focus is that since senders do not receive
information about the history of receiver play at the population level, they cannot form
beliefs based on that information. Instead they have to make inferences from what they
learn about sender population.
3. ESTIMATION OF SR MODEL9
In this section we report the results of estimation for the SR model of behavior
using sender data. The SR and BBL models both use propensities to determine choice
probabilities. In our extensive form game setting, we have to make a choice of whether we
want to think of players as updating propensities of actions or of strategies. Both choices
constrain the way in which the updating at one information set affects the updating at
other information sets. If actions are updated, then there are no links across the
information sets. If strategies are updated, then choice probabilities change continually at
every information set. We chose updating of actions, which amounts to treating each
player-information set pair as a separate player. We use the index i to refer to such a pair
(i, q), where i denotes one of the six senders, q a type realization for that sender, and the
pair i is called a player.
By SR we mean that individual play is affected only by rewards obtained from own
past play.  Specifically, following Alvin E. Roth and  Ido  Erev (1995) define the
propensity, Qim(t), of player i to send message m at time t as:
im0im1im Q(t) =Q(t-1)X(t-1) jj +                      
(1)
where  Xim(t-1) is the reward player i receives from sending message m at time t-1. Time
here measures the number of occurrences of a specific type for a fixed sender and j0
measures the lag effect (i.e. the importance of forgetting). Note that t is not real time. We
refer to the parameter of Qim(t-1) as the forgetting parmeter and the parameter of Xim(t-1)
as the reward parameter. Given this specification of propensities, the probability that











To complete the specification of the SR model we require an initial condition for
the propensities- the values of Qim(1).  In the spirit of Roth and Erev (1995) we set Qi1(1)
= Qi2(1) = 350, which is on the scale of rewards received by participants in the
experiments.
The senders, who can be of two types, can send message “1” or “2”. Let y =
I{message = “2”},  where I{A} is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if event A
occurs and 0 otherwise. The log likelihood function for the sender data is
NT
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i = 1t = 2
lnL(,)[y(t)ln(P(t))+(1-y(t))ln(1-P(t))] jj =￿￿         (3)
where Pi2 (t) is the probability of sending message “2”.
To show explicity how the likelihood function (3) depends on the parameters j0,
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Q(t)(Q(1)Q(1))(X(j)-X(j))(X(j)-X(j)) jjjjj D=-+= ￿￿ (5)
since i1i2 Q(1)-Q(1) = 0.
From  (5), we see that the identification of the parameters j0 and j1 depends on
the speed of learning. Consider the behavior of the difference in the rewards, Xi1(t) –
Xi2(t), t = 1, 2,…. If the players converge to equilibrium in the first round, then the11
difference in the rewards does not change over time: Xi1(t) – Xi2(t) = c for t = 1, 2,…. The
consequence is that j0 and j1 are not identified. Of course, if the reward parameter is
zero, j1  = 0, then j0 is not identified.
More generally, the speed of learning determines the amount of the available
sample information that is relevant for estimating the parameters. Suppose Xi1(t) – Xi2(t) =
c for t > T* then increasing T beyond T*, T >T*,  will not increase the precision of the
estimator. Rapid learning means that T* is small, and hence there is, relatively speaking,
little information available to estimate the parameters. On the other hand, increasing T
beyond T* will appear to improve the fit of the model to the data. We refer to this effect
as convergence bias. Convergence bias is discussed in more detail in section 8.
           The likelihood function was maximized separately for each of the 15 replications
using observations from period 2 onwards. The results of doing so are shown in Table 3.
Columns 2 and 3 of the table contain the maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of j0 and  j1
and columns 4 and 5 contain the log likelihood value at the optimum, and McFadden's
(1974) psuedo-R
2 statistic. The psuedo-R




U is the maximized value of the likelihood and L
R is the value of the likelihood function
when j1= 0 and j1 = 0, L
R = L(0, 0). From (2) the value of  the lnL(0,0) = -NTln(2)   =
-(6·20)ln(2) = -83.17. This is because j1= 0 and j1 = 0 imply that Qim(t) = 0 for all t, and
hence that the probability of message “2”  is Pi2(t) = 0.5.
The feature that stands out in Table 3 is the fit of the SR model. When the
parameters are chosen optimally, the SR model fits the experimental data well for the
common interest games with history, judging by the psuedo-R
2 values reported in column
5. In general, the SR model tends to fit Game 1 with history better than Game 1 without12
history. A puzzle is why history should matter for SR. The SR model performs well for the
divergent interest games when there is convergence to a separating equilibrium, which
occurs in G3R1 and G3R2. For G4R3 the relatively good performance is explained by the
fact that one sender type, q2, is almost fully identified even though the pooling equilibrium
occurs. It should be noted that the ML estimates maximize the log likelihood, not the
psuedo-R
2.
Figure 1 shows the probability of sending message 2 for each agent type by period
for the 15 replications. The smooth line marked with triangles shows the predicted fraction
of type 1 agents playing message “2” each period while the smooth line marked with
circles shows the model's predicted fraction of type 2 agents playing message “2”.  The
fraction of type 1 agents actually playing message “2” is shown by the upper jagged line
while the fraction of type 2 agents actually playing message 2 is shown by the lower
jagged line. Thus, in the game shown in the top left-hand graph in the figure - G1R1 -
50% of type 1 agents play message “2” in round 1, as do 50% of type 2 agents.  By period
7, 100% of type 1 agents play message 2, and 100% of type two agents play message 1.
A similar pattern appears in replications 2 of Game 1 and in all three replications of Game
2. The players converge to equilibrium less rapidly in replication 3 of Game 1 and in the
divergent interest games. A complete discussion of the empirical patterns in these
experiments is given in  Blume et al. (1998).  Figure 1 demonstrates that in many
experiments SR fits the data of BDKS reasonably well.
4. ESTIMATION OF THE BBL MODEL
An alternative literature (e.g., John B. Van  Huyck, Raymond C.  Battalio, and
Fredrick W. Rankin (1996), Yin-Wong Cheung and Daniel Friedman (1997)) argues that13
variants of fictitious play–BBL-are better characterizations of play in experiments.  BBL
is expected to dominate SR because BBL uses more information, namely in our setting the
experiences of other participants.
 In the BBL model we define the propensity, Qij(t), of player i to play action j at
time t as:
im0im1im Q(t) ßQ(t1)ßX(t1) =-+-        (6)
where ‘Xim (t-1) is the expected reward of player i from taking action j based on data
available at time t-1. The expected reward is calculated using the past frequencies of play.
For the senders, h q
t m
-1( | ) is the frequency of type q given message m in period t-1, and
for receivers, r
t a m
-1( | ) is the frequency of action a given message m in period t-1.
The choice probabilities again are logit as in (2) with (6) replacing (1) as the definition of
Qij, and in the likelihood function (3). The models are similar in that both use propensities
to determine choice probabilities.
In our setting, the senders do not observe the history of receiver play and hence
calculate the expected frequency of action a given message m,  ) | ( ˆ
1 m a
t- r , from data on
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Table 4 contains the estimates for each of the 15 replications. Columns 2 and 3 of14
the table contain the ML estimates of b0 and b1, and columns 4 and 5 contain the log
likelihood value at the optimum, and the psuedo-R
2 statistic evaluated at the ML
estimates.
Two features stand out in the table. First, in the case of the common interest
games, the BBL model performs as expected in the sense that it tends to fit better when
history information is available. The comparison of psuedo-R
2’s is suggestive: BBL fits
about as well as SR, sometimes better and sometimes worse, in common interest games
with population history information while SR wins without that information. SR tends to
fit better than BBL in divergent interest games. The fit of this model is illustrated in Figure
2, which shows the relation of predicted response and actual response by period. In Figure
2 what stands out is the poor performance of BBL in Game 1 without history and in Game
4.
Second,  b0, the forgetting coefficient in the BBL model, is negative in two
replications of Game 1 without history, G1NHR1 and G1NHR2, and in two replications
of Game 4, G4R1 and G4R2. In every one of these four cases, the fit of the BBL model is
very poor, which suggests that the BBL model is not the correct model.
For these four cases, we also note that the null hypothesis that coefficient of the
expected reward is equal to zero, b1 = 0, is overwhelmingly accepted by the conventional
likelihood ratio test. In the conventional test, the asymptotic critical value is based on the
chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. For each of the four likelihood ratio
tests, the P-value based on the chi-square (1) distribution is at least 0.30. Note that the
null hypothesis b1 = 0 is also accepted by the conventional likelihood ratio test for G3R3
as well as G4R3.15
The test for b1 = 0 ( i.e., there is no learning)  is interesting  because when b1 = 0 is
true, the forgetting parameter b0 is not identified. Thus, it not so surprising that a negative
estimate of b0 occurs. Although the above test results for b1 = 0 appear to support the
conclusion that no learning is taking place, these test results must be treated with utmost
caution. Even if the BBL model is correct, which is very doubtful, the conventional test
may produce misleading results due to the fact that nuisance parameter b0 is not identified
when the null b1 = 0 is true.
As in the case of the SR model, the lack of identification is due to the fact that
Qi1(t) = Qi2(t)  for all t when b1 = 0, which implies that Pi2(t) = 0.5 for all t. Hansen
(1996), Andrews (1997), Stinchcombe and White (1998) and others have investigated the
general case of hypothesis testing when the nuisance parameter is not identified under the
null. Their results show that the relevant asymptotic distribution theory is nonstandard: the
asymptotic distribution of the test statistic, instead of being chi-square, may depend on the
value of the nuisance parameter.
5. POOLING
In above analysis, we have treated each replication of a particular game as
independent, and obtained separate estimates of the parameters from each.  Since the
underlying learning rule is assumed to be the same in each replication it may make sense to
pool the observations across each replication, and potentially across the different games.
If such aggregation were warranted it would admit more precise inference.  Whether one
can pool the replications of a particular experimental game involving learning is of
independent interest.  One obvious circumstance where pooling would be inappropriate is
one where the participants followed different learning rules.  In this case combining the16
replications of a game will pool learning processes that are fundamentally different, i.e.,
have different values of j b i i or , , i = 0,1.
Alternatively, even where the learning process is the same, the evolution of play
may be quite different because of the incentives that the participants face.  For example, in
the games that we study, Games 1 and 2 have  an equilibrium that both senders and
receivers strictly prefer. Note that in Game 2 there is also a pooling equilibrium where
action a3 is taken regardless of the message sent. In Games 3 and 4 by way of contrast the
interests of the senders and receivers are not perfectly aligned, with receivers preferring
the separating over the pooled equilibrium relatively more in Game 3 than Game 4.  The
possibility of different equilibrium selection in these games leads to the possibility that the
outcomes are situation specific and that the data from the experiments cannot be simply
pooled.
To examine whether the replication data can be pooled we fit the SR model to the
three replications of each experimental game.  Then the standard chi-squared test based on
minus 2 times the difference of the log likelihoods is used to compare the constrained and
unconstrained values of the likelihood function.  There are three replications for each
game so there are 2 · 3 = 6 parameters estimated in the unconstrained case and 2 in the
constrained case, resulting in chi-square tests with 4 degrees of freedom.  The results are
displayed in Table 5.  In both Games 1 and 2 with history the data suggest that a common
learning rule is followed.  Indeed, the marginal significance level of the test statistics is at
least 35% across the tests, suggesting that it is not even a close call.  In contrast, the data
for Games 3 and 4 are not compatible with a common learning model. In each case the
chi-square test rejects the hypothesis of a learning rule with common parameter values17
and, again, the rejection is not a close call. Of course, other combinations could be tested
for pooling. The message delivered by the above results is that even pooling across the
replications of the same experimental game is not always possible, and hence the focus of
the subsequent statistical analysis is on individual replications.
6. SHAPE OF LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS
The likelihood functions for the SR and BBL models are not globally concave. As
a consequence, standard maximization routines are not guaranteed to locate a global
optimum.  In fact, we frequently found that quasi-Newton methods alone would get stuck
at local optima, or wander aimlessly in flat sections of the function.  Figure 3 shows the
typical shape of the likelihood function for SR models in games of common interest, in this
case G1R3, while Figure 4 shows the shape of the likelihood function for the BBL  model
in the case of G1R3.
Note that although the likelihood functions are shaped quite differently, both
exhibit large flat spots and multiple local optima.  The SR likelihood function also
characteristically has a long ridge, as the contour plots in Figure 3 illustrate.
To obtain the MLE’s we initially used a grid search on the parameter space,
evaluating the function 2,500 times. This grid search always included the point (0,0) so
that the no-learning model was always considered.  The maximum maximorum of these
points was used to pick the starting values for the first derivative method.  We used
BFGS(   ) with golden section search to obtain an optimum.  Graphical inspection of the
likelihood surface was used to assess whether a global optimum had been reached.18
7. COMPARING SR AND BBL MODELS
The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that SR and BBL tend to fit about equally well
for the common interest games with history on the basis of the psuedo-R
2 values, and that
BBL fits better in the common interest games with history than without history. Further,
SR tends to fit better for the divergent interest games. While this is suggestive, it is
difficult to make probabilistic comparisons between the SR and BBL models because the
models are non-nested.  By a non-nested model we mean that the model being tested, the
null hypothesis, is not a special case of the alternative model to which it is compared. In
our setting, the two models can be artificially nested, however, with the consequence that
they can be compared using standard testing procedures. This fact has been exploited by
Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho (1999), who recognized that SR and BBL models are
nested in a general class of models which use propensities to determine choice
probabilities
In this section, the approach of  Camerer and Ho (1999) is adapted to our
experimental data.  The updating equation is modified to include both own and expected
payoffs:
ij0ij1ij2ij Q(t)Q(t-1)X(t-1)X(t-1) ggg =++ (8)
where   ij X(t-1) is the expected payoff from making choice j at time t-1 and Xij(t-1) is the
actual payoff from making choice j at time t-1. We refer to the model with the updating
equation (8) as the hybrid model since it is a combination of the SR and BBL models.
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The likelihood function for the sender data was maximized separately for each of
the 15 replications using observations from period 2 onwards. The results of maximization19
are shown in Table 6.  Columns 2, 3 and 4 of the table contain the estimates of g0, g1 and
g2  and columns 5 and 6 contains the log likelihood value at its optimum and the value of
psuedo-R
2. The fit of the hybrid model is usually better than the fit of either the SR or
BBL model. Note that the ML estimation algorithm failed to converge for G2R2 and
G2R3 due a singular Hessian.
In Table 7, columns 2 and 3 report the Wald t statistics for testing the hypotheses
H0: g1 = 0 and H0: g2 = 0. Each null hypothesis is evaluated using a symmetric test at the
nominal 5% level and hence by the Bonferroni inequality the probability of simultaneously
rejecting both hypotheses is approximately 0.10.  The results of this pair of tests are
summarized in columns 4, 5, 6 and 7. Rejection of H0: g1 = 0 is interpreted as acceptance
of BBL and rejection of H0: g2 = 0 as acceptance of SR.
From an inspection of these columns, we see that in 10 out of the 13 replications
SR is accepted and BBL is rejected.  This is consistent with ranking of the models based
on the psuedo-R
2’s reported in Table 3 and 4. As is intuitively plausible, this result occurs
mainly in Game 1 without history and the Games 3 and 4, the divergent interest games.
Both SR and BBL are rejected in 2 out of 13 replications (H0: g1 = 0 is accepted and H0:
g2 = 0 is accepted); this occurs in Games 1 and 3, G1R2 and G3R1.   In Game 1 with
history the results are mixed. BBL was accepted and SR rejected (H0: g1 = 0 is rejected
and H0: g2 = 0 is accepted) in G1R1 while the reverse is true in G1R3. Both are rejected in
G1R2. The conclusions drawn from this testing exercise are similar to those produced by
comparing the psuedo-R2’s in Tables 3 and 4.
The tests were also conducted at the nominal 2.5% level, that is, using a critical
value of 2.27. In this case, the probability of simultaneously rejecting both hypotheses is20
approximately 0.05 using the  Bonferroni inequality. The decrease in the nominal
probability of making a Type I error only affected the test results for G3R3. Instead of
only BBL being rejected, both BBL and SR are now simultaneously rejected.
There are two potential problems with artificial nesting using the hybrid model.
The first is that if H0: g1 = 0 and H0: g2 = 0 is true, then g0 is not identified. The argument
is similar to that previously discussed in connection with the BBL model. In this situation,
the usual asymptotic distribution theory does not apply: the asymptotic distributions of the
t statistics for testing H0: g1 = 0 and H0: g2 = 0 are not, in general, standard normal when
the nulls are true. Hence, the finding that the null hypotheses H0: g1 = 0 and H0: g2 = 0 are
simultaneously accepted in two cases when the absolute critical value is 2.00 and in three
cases when the absolute critical value is 2.27 must be treated with caution.
Second, the explanatory variables may be highly collinear. Our results appear to be
influenced by multicollinearity between the expected reward  ij X(t-1)and the actual reward
Xij(t-1). The source of the multicollinearity is due to learning. If play converges to a pure
strategy equilbrium, then the actual and expected reward variables take on identical values.
Thus, after convergence to  equilbrium there is exact  collinearity between the two
information variables. Multicollinearity tends to be more of a problem in the common
interest games; in particular, the rapid convergence to equilibrium appears to explain the
singular  Hessian in G2R2 and G2R3. The degree of  multicollinearity depends on the
number of observations included in the data after convergence has been achieved. This
matter is discussed in more detail in the following section.
8. CONVERGENCE BIAS21
It is common practice to include all observations from a particular experiment in
any statistical estimation or testing exercise based on that experiment.  Yet information
about learning can only come from observations where learning occurs.  As noted earlier,
once behavior has converged, observations have no further information about learning.
Including such observations will make the model appear to “fit” better, while at the same
time reducing the contrast between models, making it difficult to distinguish the models
empirically.  The data shown in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that convergence typically occurs
within 5 to 7 periods, while observations are included in the estimation for the entire
sequence, in these data up to 20 periods.
 To illustrate the possible bias that this might cause we calculated the psuedo-R
2
and average log likelihood (the maximized log likelihood divided by number of
observations used) by progressively removing observations from the later periods, that is,
by removing observations that include convergence.  Figure 5 illustrates this bias for the
replication G1R1 for BBL and SR. Under the hypothesis of no convergence bias we
would expect the psuedo-R
2 and the average log likelihood to be invariant to the number
of periods included. Hence, under the hypothesis, the curves in panels (a) and (b) in Figure
5 would have zero slope.  In fact, all four curves have positive slope, which is
characteristic of convergence bias. However, the difference between the curves in each
panel is approximately constant in these data, which suggests that convergence bias makes
both models appear to fit the data better, but does not otherwise bias the comparison of
SR and BBL.22
To measure the amount of bias requires taking a position on when convergence
has occurred, a classification that  is better made on individual data. We define the
convergence operator Tp(yit) by
T y if y y y p it it it it p ( ) ... = = = = - - 1 1 (9)
                       = 0else
In other words a player's (pure) strategy is said to have converged if the same action is
taken p times in a row.
5   To eliminate convergence bias one simply excludes observations
where Tp = 1.  We used this procedure with p = 3 and p = 4 to assess the extent of this
bias.  We found that at least for these data, the extent of the bias was small.
9. RELATED LITERATURE
There is an extensive and growing literature in experimental economics on
learning. For example, see Richard T.  Boylan and  Mahmoud A. El-Gamal  (1993),
Camerer and Ho (1999),  Cheung and Friedman (1997), David J. Cooper and Nick
Feltovich (1996), James C. Cox, Jason Shachat and Mark Walker (1995), Vincent P.
Crawford (1995), Roth and Erev (1995).
 6  The literature generally focuses on two broad
classes of learning models, stimulus-response and belief based play.  A wide variety of
games are considered with various designs, e.g., whether or not players are provided with
the history of the game.  The performances of the learning models are evaluated using
simulation and various statistical techniques. Unfortunately, the findings are mixed at best.
This could be due to statistical issues, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine's (1998)23
conjecture that with convergence to Nash in the "short term," the models maybe
indistinguishable, or a combination of the two.
Roth and Erev (1995) focus on the stimulus-response model.  Their concern is
high (super rationality) versus low (stimulus-response) game theory and intermediate (e.g.,
Fudenberg and Levine’s “short term”) versus asymptotic results. Their model is a simple
individual reinforcement dynamic in which propensities to play a strategy are updated
based upon success of past play.  Using simulation, they compare the simulated results to
their experimental results.  The simulated outcomes are similar to observed behavior and,
more importantly, vary similarly across the different games considered. They interpret this
as robustness of the intermediate run outcomes to the chosen learning rule.  Comparisons
have also been made between the stimulus-response model of Roth and Erev or similar
reinforcement dynamics (e.g., Robert R. Bush and Frederick Mosteller (1955) and John G.
Cross (1983)) and other learning models.   Using  logit, simulation or other statistical
techniques, the general conclusions of these papers are that stimulus-response works well
and that additional information when part of the design makes a difference; see Dilip
Mookherjee and Barry Sopher (1994, 1997), Ido Erev and Amnon Rapoport (1998) and
Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth  (1997).
Using a variety of games and an information condition (with and without game
history) in an extended probit, Cheung and Friedman’s (1997) find that the belief based
model has more support than stimulus-response learning and information matters. Boylan
and El-Gamal (1993) find that fictitious play is the overwhelming choice when compared
with Cournot learning in their evaluation. Using the standard logit model, Van Huyck et
al. (1997) focus on symmetric coordination games and evaluate the performance of the24
replicator dynamic, fictitious and exponential fictitious play. Exponential fictitious play
does best. Models of reinforcement learning can be used to justify the replicator dynamic
(e.g., Tilman Boergers and Rajiv Sarin (1997)).
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey’s (1995) model of quantal response
equilibria in normal form games deserves attention here.  The quantal response model is
Nash with error.  Using the logit model, they find that the quantal response model wins
when compared to Nash without error and random choice.  Important for us is their
conclusion that errors are an important component in explaining experimental results.
This has been implicitly assumed in the previous studies when logits and probits are used
and explicitly assumed in the Erev and Roth (1997) study with simulations.
The lack of general findings in these and other papers has prompted Camerer and
Ho (1999) to essentially give up on the horse race and develop a general model, which has
as special cases the principal learning models in the literature. The key that ties the SR
models to the BBL models is the reinforcement used.  In the SR model, only actions that
were taken are updated based on the actual payoffs, and in the BBL model every action is
updated based on its hypothetical payoff, that is, the payoff it would receive had the action
been taken. When actual and hypothetical payoffs are the same so are the models.  Using
maximum likelihood estimation under the constraints of logit, Camerer and Ho evaluate
the possible contribution of the general model across a variety of games.  As one would
hope, the general model explains more of the variation.
Reinhard Selten (1997) is the true agnostic.  He claims there is not enough data to
form any conclusions, either theoretical or statistical. The best we can do is very general25
qualitative models (e.g., learning direction theory) in which there are tendencies that are
distinct from random behavior but nothing more.  This view brings us full circle to
Fudenberg and Levine’s conjecture about whether you can distinguish among the models
if equilibrium play is observed in the “short term” or alternatively, the statistical issues
make such comparisons moot. The resolution of this debate is ultimately an empirical one.
It is an important debate to address because of its implications for understanding the roles
of learning and communication in coordinating activities.
10. SUMMARY AND FUTURE AGENDA
In this paper, we focused on the two principal learning models used in the
literature, SR and BBL, using a sender-receiver game.  In the experiment, an extensive
form game is played repeatedly among players who are randomly matched before each
round of play. This population-game environment is particularly appropriate for a
comparison of myopic learning rules, if we believe that it lessens the role of repeated game
strategies. Sender-receiver games with costless and a priori meaningless messages have
the advantage that no matter how we specify the incentives, coordination requires
communication and communication requires learning.
 One consequence of studying learning in extensive form games is that since
players in the experiment observe only each others’ actions, not strategies, the principal
difference between the two learning models is in the roles they assign to own experience
versus population experience. Another consequence is that there are different natural
specifications even for a learning model as simple as SR; we chose the cognitively least26
demanding one, in which experience at one information set does not transfer to other
information sets. Our results show that both the SR and BBL models fit the data
reasonably well in common interest games with history. On the other hand, the test results
accept SR and reject BBL in the games with no history and in all but one of the divergent
interest games.
One of our findings, the inability to distinguish between the SR and BBL models in
common interest games with history, illustrates the problems with discriminating among
proposed learning models. The issue raised by this problem and those of other is how to
learn more about learning from experiments. The starting point for our agenda for the
future is based on the fact that learning models in games specify the data generating
process. As a consequence, the models can be simulated. This opens up the possibility of
investigating problems of optimal experimental design in game theory. It is worth stressing
that our treatment of testing with experimental data has been, from a statistical point of
view, entirely conventional.  We have assumed that standard asymptotic theory provides a
reliable guide for inference in models with sample sizes encountered in experimental
economics.
Approximations based on asymptotic theory may be poor for sample sizes typically
used in practice.  In particular, the true probability of making a Type I error may be very
different than the nominal probability. The simulated data can be used to estimate the
probability of making a Type I error for tests based on the conventional asymptotic critical
values.  If asymptotic critical values do not work, then the performance of other
approximations can be investigated, for example, bootstrap-based critical values.
 Moreover, as has been noted, if the nuisance parameter is not identified when the27
null is true, then the usual asymptotic theory is not applicable. This situation arises when
testing that the reward parameter is zero. The simulated data can also be used to
investigate the distribution of the test statistics in this case.
Once the probability of making a Type I error is under control, the powers of the
tests can be examined.  This will tell the sample size needed to be able to discriminate
between the models. Finally, considerations of power lead to an optimal design
framework, a framework that will enable us to design our experiments so as to learn more
about learning.28
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Table 1. Payoffs of Games in Experiments
Panel (a)
Actions
Types Game 1 Game 2
a1 a2 a1 a2 a3
q1 0,0 700,700 0,0 700,700 400,400
q2 700,700 0,0 700,700 0,0 400,400
Panel (b)
Actions
Types Game 3 Game 4
a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
q1 0,0 200,700 400,400 0,0 200,500 400,400
q2 200,700 0,0 400,400 200,500 0,0 400,40032
.
Table 2. Experimental Treatments




G1 Game 1 Session II Senders 20
G1NH Game 1 Session II No history 20
G2 Game 2 Session II Senders 20
G3 Game 3 Session II Senders 40
G4 Game 4 Session II Senders 40
Note: In the analysis of the experimental data only the first 20 periods are used for G3 and
G4.33
Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of SR  Model











































































































Notes: N = 6 times the number of periods (20) minus 12.
Standard errors in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.34
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of BBL Model











































































































Notes: See Table 3.35






Game 2 0.288 0.991
Game 3 28.487 0.001
Game 4 22.857 0.001
a Game 1 with history36
Table 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Hybrid Model































































































































Notes: See Table 3.
a ML failed to converge; Hessian singular at maximum.37
Table 7. 0.05 Symmetric Wald t Tests of Hybrid Model
Model t statistic
H0: g1 = 0
t statistic
H0: g2 = 0
A H0: g1 = 0
A H0: g2 = 0
R H0: g1 = 0
A H0: g2 = 0
A H0: g1 = 0
R H0: g2 = 0
R H0: g1 = 0
  R H0: g2 = 0
G1R1
(N=108)
2.94 1.34 0 1 0 0
G1R2
(N=108)
1.81 1.63 1 0 0 0
G1R3
(N=108)
1.69 3.59 0 0 1 0
G1NHR1
(N=108)
0.77 3.49 0 0 1 0
G1NHR2
(N=108)
0.30 3.05 0 0 1 0
G1NHR3
(N=108)
1.33 4.16 0 0 1 0
G2R1
(N=108)







1.78 0.54 1 0 0 0
G3R2
(N=108)
0.89 3.26 0 0 1 0
G3R3
(N=108)
0.28 2.20 0 0 1 0
G4R1
(N=108)
0.96 3.21 0 0 1 0
G4R2
(N=108)
0.38 4.28 0 0 1 0
G4R3
(N=108)
0.27 4.34 0 0 1 0
Total 2 1 10 0
Notes: A denotes acceptance of H0 using a nominal 0.05 symmetric asymptotic test and
and R the rejection of H0 using this test. The critical values are – 2.0, and the nominal
probability of simultaneously accepting both hypotheses when they are true is
asymptotically at least 0.90 when both hypotheses are true.38
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Figure 1. Plots of the actual (jagged line) and the predicted fraction (smooth line) of
players sending message 2 by type (D = type 1, 0 = type 2) when the SR model is true39
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Figure 2. Plots of the actual (jagged line) and the predicted fraction (smooth line) of
players sending message 2 by type (D = type 1, 0 = type 2) when the BBL model is true40
Figure 3. Log likelihood function for SR model using G1R1 data41
Figure  4. Log likelihood function for BBL model using G1R1 data42
Panel (a)      R-square Comparison by Model
     Experiment = Game 1
   Included Rounds






Panel (b)      Average log Likelihood Comparison by Model
     Experiment = Game 1
        Included Rounds





Figure 5. Convergence bias:D--BBL;0--SR4344
ENDNOTES
                                               
1  For example, See David Austin-Smith (1990), Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel
(1982), Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons (1990), Frank Gigler (1994) and Jeremy Stein
(1989).
2 All replications had a common session, which preceded the games described above.  In
particular, each cohort participated in 20 periods of a game with payoffs as in Game 1 and
a message space of M = {A, B}.  The common session provides players with experience
about experimental procedures and ensures that players understand the structure of the
game, message space and population history.
3 The specification of the logit function in (2) exploits the fact that all rewards, X, in the
games that we examine are non-negative.  Were this not the case, a transform that keeps
the value of the payoffs non-negative, such as the exponential function, can be used.
4 The coefficients in the hybrid model can be normalized so that the coefficients on the
information variables are d and (1- d), respectively, which makes the hybrid model look
similar to the model employed Camerer and Ho (1999).
5 Defining convergence for mixed strategies is conceptually the same as the pure strategy
case; empirically identifying convergence is more difficult.
6  The number of studies is growing at an increasing rate. We have selected representatives
from the set and apologize for any omissions.